Edited by Gavriel D. Rosenfeld

Friday, June 24, 2016

With Friends Like These...: Vladimir Putin Endorses Counterfactual History


As if counterfactual history did not have enough critics, Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent endorsement of the field will surely discredit further by associating it with the stigma of authoritarianism.


In a new article published in the Russian News Agency, Tass, Putin was quoted at a meeting of the All-Russia Historical Assembly on Wednesday saying some positive things about historical “what ifs.”

After stressing the importance of history for the nation’s identity he observed:

"Some say history admits of no ‘what-ifs’. This is very true. The same applies to politics. But there is a place for such speculations in science, and this may be of great importance and interest."

The article goes on to note that Putin “shared some impressions of a recent meeting with a German friend of his,” noting: "You’ve just said it is crucial to know the atrocities the Nazis committed on our soil. That German friend of mine has read quite a few historical documents and he paid attention to what Hitler had planned to do, in case of victory, to the Russian people, and where the Russian people would’ve found themselves then - far away in Siberia, where they would’ve been doomed to extinction."

Putin went on to observe that such facts "should be known to everybody, including those who have been trying to re-evaluate what happened in the past and to make conclusions nobody is in the position to make today to condemn somebody."

"It’s worth taking a look at what would’ve been in store for us, had we suffered a defeat. This is very important," Putin said. In his opinion from the standpoint of science "all aspects are of interest - what really happened and what could have happened."

Counterfactual history as a mode of analysis is politically neutral.  But its embrace by Putin may solidify the suspicion of left-liberal critics like Richard Evans that it inherently expresses a right-wing sensibility.

While it may be true that there’s no such thing as bad publicity, there’s no denying that counterfactual history now has another hurdle to surmount in its bid for mainstream acceptance.


Thursday, June 2, 2016

Thomas Weber's Hitler Counterfactuals: Part II

It’s always a pleasure to engage in counterfactual discussion, and so I’m happy to post Professor Thomas Weber’s emailed response to my blog post from yesterday:


"Your blog post is most interesting and intriguing.  As to your point that one would think that a left-leaning Hitler would have opposed a right-wing Russia that had triumphed over the Bolsheviks in the civil war, my response would be that a) Hitler had never had any sympathy towards the kind of internationalism of the Bolsheviks, but for different kind of leftwing ideas, and b) that by the time Hitler started to take an interest in Russia and in the possibility of a Tsarist restoration, he had already moved to the right.”

“As to your second point, my response would be to say that Hitler, as well as Tsarist émigrés in Germany, argued that Germany and Russia never had been ‘natural’ enemies (but that only circumstances had turned the two countries into enemies during WWI, which according to their logic had been to the detriment of both countries). Furthermore, Hitler would have argued that he was not responsible for the Treaty of Brest-Litowsk, and, more importantly, that in his mind the Treaty of Brest-Litowsk had not been intended as a punitive peace and that it had kept Russia proper intact. In fact, Hitler repeatedly gave talks making that very point.”

“Furthermore, Hitler believed Germany to be weak in the early 1920s and thus believed that Germany on its own would face an uphill struggle to turn into the kind of empire that could survive in a new world of empires. It was in this context that National Socialists and some Russian émigrés started to see common ground and to argue that a sustainable and permanent alliance between the two countries would solve their respective strategic challenges.”

“You also ask “if Hitler and the Nazis become powerful, as in real history, but the Whites had won the Civil War (which never happened), might not Hitler have ended up invading Russia in a different kind of World War II regardless.” My response would be to say that Hitler would have seen an alliance with Russia as a path towards becoming successful and thus would, in all likelihood, have pursued a different strategy to becoming powerful. Of course, one may argue that a successful Hitler or successful Russian royalists may have been considerably less likely to compromise and enter into an alliance than Tsarist émigrés and Hitler intended to be in a situation of desperation.”

“It is difficult to give a brief answer to your question as to whether Hitler “might not also have pursued the Final Solution of the Jewish question” anyway. The answer to that question depends on the extent to which the Final Solution had already been predetermined by, say, 1919, or even 1933. I would argue that he certainly would have pursued a final solution, yet that it is open to debate as to what form that final solution would have taken, if the historical context of the implementation of that final solution had been different from the history that really was."

My response to Weber’s comments is as follows:

Thanks for all of your thoughtful comments.

I suppose the underlying question that I am interested in is the degree to which Nazi Germany’s invasion of the USSR in 1941 (along with the intensification of the genocidal assault against Europe’s Jews) was fueled by anti-Bolshevism.  While many historians have argued that it was central (and that Hitler’s antisemitism was a function of his anti-Bolshevism), I remain skeptical and see the latter as subordinated to the former. 

I am intrigued by the possibility of testing this proposition counterfactually by imagining the scenario of Nazi Germany facing a right-wing monarchistic regime in Russia in 1939-41.  If the Whites had won the Civil War and defeated the Bolsheviks, would the Nazis have developed a different foreign policy? 

This begs the question, of course, of whether the Nazis even would have been able to seize power in 1933 without the threat of a Soviet communist regime that could be exploited for domestic political purposes in Germany.  Some scholars, such as Tim Snyder, would probably say no.  I would argue that it partly depends on the timing of the White victory.  If it occurred only after years of fighting and bloodshed, say in the mid-1920s, it would have left lasting scars and fears of a possible Bolshevik comeback that the Nazis could have exploited for their own purposes in the same way that the existence of an actual Bolshevik regime could have been exploited.  Also, even had the Whites won a quick victory in Russia, Germany still would have been rocked by the socialist and communist revolutions of 1918-20 and by continued communist agitation in the Weimar era.  So anticommunist sentiment in Germany would have remained high, thereby benefiting Hitler.  Moreover, the Great Depression arguably would have happened as it did in real history, and so the Nazis’ rise to power does not seem like it would have been affected by a White victory in Russia.

But how would this victory have shaped the Nazi regime’s foreign policy?  Would Hitler still have developed his Lebensraum ambitions in the East?  I am inclined to think so.  First, Hitler’s view of the “food crisis” facing Germany (and the necessity of finding new farmland somewhere) would have directed his attention away from western expansion (ie. towards France and the Benelux nations) and instead towards the east (where Ukraine’s grain was located); so, too, would his awareness of the fact that the east was where Germany’s ethnic German minorities actually lived, who needed to be incorporated for racial/Social Darwinistic reasons into a Greater Germany. 

If these practical questions are viewed as potentially decisive, then the question becomes how the Nazis would have justified an invasion of Russia ideologically.  In real history, of course, Barbarossa was justified as a global crusade against Bolshevism and international Jewry.  Without a Bolshevik regime, what would Hitler have invoked as a rationale for invasion?  Could antisemitic ideas, which still would have been powerful in Nazi Germany, been exploited to justify a crusade against a right-wing, nationalistic, monarchistic Russia?  I suppose some of this depends on what would have happened to Russia’s Jews following a White victory in the civil war.  Given the fact that hundreds of thousands of Jews were massacred by White forces and other nationalist groups in the years 1917-23, they might have fared terribly in White-ruled Russia.  Many might have fled elsewhere (though most might have stayed if monarchist forces had eventually been able to restore order).  A miserable, oppressed Russian Jewish community, however, does not lend itself so easily to being exploited by the Nazis in the same way that, in real history, they portrayed Soviet Jewry as the string-pullers behind the Bolshevik regime. 

Of course, If Bolshevik forces had remained a threat within Russian society – that is to say, if a Bolshevik insurgency had continued to simmer underground, with periodic attacks, and the like, against the restored Tsarist state – then Hitler could have made the case that the Jewish/communist threat remained severe and needed to be eradicated.  As in the pre-1914 Tsarist world, which produced the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, antisemitic tropes could have been mobilized to justify an invasion of a right-wing nationalist Russia.  

(Left undetermined in this scenario, by the way, is the question of whether a neo-Tsarist regime would have actually been able to retake power in a post-civil war Russia, or whether it would have been some kind of right-wing fascist style regime, ruled by a strong man, without any monarchical connection.  Obviously, nationalist regimes can go to war with one another, though a fascist Russian government may have been ideologically inclined to ally with Nazi Germany).


Needless to say, I still need to give these ideas a good deal more thought – and, indeed, plan on doing so in my very-much-in-the-planning-stages book project on “What If?” scenarios pertaining to the Holocaust.  But I am convinced that part of the analytical problem involves assessing the relative weight of antisemitism and anti-Bolshevism as variables in the Final Solution.  In order to prove the centrality of Nazi antisemitism, one would need to show Hitler to be just as committed to invading a non-communist Soviet Union in alternate history as he was committed to invading a Communist USSR in real history.

Wednesday, June 1, 2016

New Hitler Counterfactuals: Thomas Weber Speculates About Hitler's Political Radicalization

In a recent interview in Die Welt, historian Thomas Weber raises some interesting counterfactuals about Hitler’s political radicalization after World War I.


As part of his newly published book, Wie Adolf Hitler zum Nazi wurde (How Adolf Hitler Became a Nazi), Weber builds upon his previous research on Hitler’s experience of World War I to show how the future Führer was radicalized not by Germany’s military defeat in November of 1918, but by the German government’s signing of the Treaty of Versailles in July of 1919. 

Weber further echoes historian Brendan Simms’s thesis that Hitler became an antisemite due to his alleged oppoisition towards Anglo-American capitalism.  Weber places Hitler on the left wing of the political spectrum in the pivotal years 1919-1920, declaring that he was not yet anti-Bolshevik.  Indeed, he claims that Hitler was interested in exploring the possibility of a German alliance with Russia.  This thesis upends the conventional view that Hitler’s antisemitism was motivated by anti-Bolshevism (ie. the notion that the Bolshevik Revolution was part of a Jewish plot for world domination) and the notion that he stood firmly on the political right.  (Weber argues that Hitler only arrived at this position relatively late, around the time he wrote Mein Kampf in 1924). 

Based on these claims, Weber arrives at several provocative counterfactuals at the end of the interview.

Asked by Die Welt, if there was any way that Hitler might have averted going down his path of political radicalization, Weber responded:

“If there had been a different ending to the Russian Civil War and a lasting alliance between Germany and a monarchistic Russia -- which Hitler favored at the time -- then there probably never would have been any ‘Lebensraum’ policy developed for Eastern Europe.”

Die Welt also asked, “was Hitler the inevitable…consequence of Germany’s defeat in World War I?”

To which Weber responded: “No.  If Bavaria had been able to democratize after the…war, and had been able to evolve gradually instead of experiencing revolutionary turmoil, then Hitler never would have found a stage to enable his rise.”

My main interest lies in the first counterfactual.  Weber speculates that a victory of the Whites in the Russian Civil War would have prevented Hitler from seeing Russia as Germany’s enemy and a zone of future colonization.  Instead, he would have regarded the country as an ally.  I need to read Weber’s book to see the evidence, but I have two thoughts:

1) I don’t see how this counterfactual squares with the idea of Hitler’s antisemitism emerging from the left – ie. from a stance of sympathy towards revolutionary socialism (however temporary). One would think that a left-leaning Hitler would have opposed a right-wing Russia that had triumphed over the Bolsheviks in the civil war.  

2) I also don’t see how, if Russia had reverted back to a monarchy – say in 1919 or 1920 – why this would have dissuaded Hitler from pursuing a policy of Lebensraum in the east anyway.  Germany and Russia were bitter enemies in World War I when both were conservative regimes.  The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk certainly made it clear that Germany had expansionist designs on Russia. 

For me, the question is this: if Hitler and the Nazis become powerful, as in real history, but the Whites had won the Civil War (which never happened), might not Hitler have ended up invading Russia in a different kind of World War II regardless?

And might he not also have pursued the Final Solution of the Jewish question as well?  Hitler still would have been an antisemite.  Germany still would have been humiliated.  How much of history would have unfolded the way it did in reality?  This raises the question of how much the Nazis’ designs in the east were motivated by anti-Bolshevism and how much they were rooted in a deterministic kind of eastern expansionism (regardless of what kind of regime existed in Russia and regardless of what kind of ideology was needed to justify conquering it). 


These questions all require further thought….

Monday, May 16, 2016

A Cornucopia of Sykes-Picot Counterfactuals

Yesterday's New York Times included an interesting article, "Could Different Borders Have Saved the Middle East?" that contains many "what ifs?" pertaining to the Anglo-French division of the Middle East during World War I. 



The Sykes-Picot Agreement is currently marking its 100th anniversary and has long been derided as having laid the groundwork of much of the contemporary Middle East's political dysfunction.  According to generations of scholars, the Agreement drew arbitrary political boundaries that corresponded only imperfectly with the region's ethnic and sectarian realities.

The implication is that without the Agreement, history would have turned out better.

But would it have?

In a perfect illustration of good counterfactual methodology, the Times articles explores alternate proposals for dividing up the region in order to show how things would have, well, turned out more or less the same.  As the article puts in (in a deterministic counterfactual): “whatever problems those schemes have caused, the alternative ideas for dividing up the region probably weren’t much better. Creating countries out of diverse territories is a violent, imperfect process.”

To cite one concrete example:



In March 1920, Faisal bin Hussein, who led the Arab armies in their British-supported revolt against the Ottomans during World War I, became the leader of the independent Arab Kingdom of Syria, based in Damascus. His ambitious borders stretched across modern-day Syria, Jordan, Israel and parts of Turkey. (But not Iraq.)

Would Faisal’s map have been an authentic alternative to the externally imposed borders that came in the end? We’ll never know. The French, who opposed his plan, defeated his army in July.  But even if they hadn’t, Faisal’s territorial claims would have put him in direct conflict with Maronite Christians pushing for independence in what is today Lebanon, with Jewish settlers who had begun their Zionist project in Palestine, and with Turkish nationalists who sought to unite Anatolia.”

An equally interesting example is an American plan from 1919. In that year, “President Woodrow Wilson sent a delegation to devise a better way to divide the region. Henry King, a theologian, and Charles Crane, an industrialist, conducted hundreds of interviews in order to prepare a map in accordance with the ideal of national self-determination.”



“Was this a missed opportunity to draw the region’s “real” borders? Doubtful. After careful study, King and Crane realized how difficult the task was: They split the difference between making Lebanon independent or making it part of Syria with a proposal for “limited autonomy.” They thought the Kurds might be best off incorporated into Iraq or even Turkey. And they were certain that Sunnis and Shiites belonged together in a unified Iraq. In the end, the French and British ignored the recommendations.”

And then my favorite part of the entire article:

“If only they had listened, things might have turned out more or less the same.”

This concluding sentence perfectly illustrates what happens when you cross a “missed opportunity counterfactual” with a “deterministic counterfactual.”

The punch line is not particularly funny, but that does not make it any less true. It epitomizes what happens when an idealist is mugged by a realist.  

Tuesday, May 10, 2016

The Case of Gregor Mendel as a "Silver Lining Counterfactual"

I’m still bogged down writing about the Fourth Reich, but I thought I would make a passing reference to the latest instance of a journalist using a counterfactual as a “hook” to grab readers’ attention.

In her recent New York Times review of Siddhartha Mukherjee’s book, The Gene: An Intimate History, Jennifer Senior writes:

“Thank heavens Gregor Mendel was a lousy priest. Had he shown even the faintest aptitude for oratory or ministering to the poor, he might never have determined the basic laws of heredity. But bumbling he was, and he made a rotten university student to boot; his failures drove him straight to his room, where he bred mice in secret. The experiment scandalized his superiors.”


 “A monk coaxing mice to mate to understand heredity was a little too risqué, even for the Augustinians,” writes Siddhartha Mukherjee in “The Gene: An Intimate History.” So Mendel switched — auspiciously, historically — to pea plants. The abbot in charge, writes the author, acquiesced this time, “giving peas a chance.”

Senior’s reference can be seen as a “silver lining counterfactual,” a “what if?” scenario that allows us to see how the seeds of success can lie latently within failure.  I will keep my eye out for other examples of how important historical figures might never have arrived at their subsequent achievements had they not first endured initial setbacks.

Wednesday, March 23, 2016

New Alternate History Film: "April and the Extraordinary World"

I’ve been derelict about posting to the CHR in recent weeks, but I’ve had a good reason.  I’m currently wrapping up a chapter of my new book on the Fourth Reich, which deals with lots of counterfactual scenarios involving unrepentant Nazis in the early 1950s as well as the possibility of Kurt Schmacher as chancellor instead of Konrad Adenauer.

Anyway, wrapping up this major chapter has taken me away from online posting.  But today I saw a news item that I thought deserved to be shared. 



It pertains to a new animated film that will premier this weekend in New York City (and then elsewhere in the coming weeks).  It’s called April and the Extraordinary World and, according to Vince Mancini’s review, which I am sharing from Uproxx, the film “is set in an alternate history version of 1941, where Napoleon’s heirs still rule France, the world’s most famous scientists have gone missing, and coal and steam power a sooty police state where empires fight each other over control of timber.”

Mancini continues:

“Yes, you could probably call it “steampunk.” I call it a whacked-out combination of Tintin, Miyazaki, and Terry Gilliam, with a typically French flair for slapstick (which, in April and the Extraordinary World, totally works).”

“It follows April, the descendant of a great French scientist, who, along with the pickpocketing police informant sent to spy on her (who falls in love with her) and her immortal talking cat named Darwin, has to find her parents and rescue them from a pair of megalomaniacal lizards, all while dodging agents of the Empire who want to kidnap her and force her to do science for them. She lives in the head of a giant statute of a muscular Napoleon with a rooster on his lap. To call April inventive would be an understatement, but it’s also charming, funny, and smartly executed.”


As a longtime fan of Tintin and Gilliam – and as a devotee of all things counterfactual – I am very excited to see this film.  Hopefully this weekend….

Thursday, March 10, 2016

Sneak Preview: "What Ifs of Jewish History"

Here is a sneak preview of the cover of "What Ifs of Jewish History," featuring essays by Steven Weitzman, René Bloch, Jonathan Ray, Bernard Cooperman, Eugene Sheppard, Jeffrey Veidlinger, Derek Pendular, Adam Rovner, Iris Bruce, Kenneth W. Stein, David Myers, Michael Brenner, Jeffrey Herf, Dirk Rupnow, and Jeffrey Gurock.


I'll post the table of contents and other relevant information closer to the volume's publication (with Cambridge University Press) in May.